Ten Scathing Quotes from the Discharge Order in the Kejriwal Case

The 598-page order is studded with quotable lines; we have culled the most hard-hitting ones.

Ten Judicial Rebukes That Sting

Now I present a comprehensive picture. What follows is a focused supplementary note that does not rely on commentary, inference, or political spin, but on the court’s own words. Discharge orders are often brief; this one is not. It repeatedly returns to a single, unsettling theme: the prosecution’s case was presented as a neat conspiracy, but the underlying material—when judicially tested even at the low threshold of charge—did not bear the weight placed on it. The sharpest passages below are reproduced verbatim, with page references, followed by brief elucidation to situate what each observation implies about the quality, method, and fairness of the investigation.

The sharpest lines in the discharge order—quoted, paginated, and explained

1) “Facts arranged to support a predetermined conclusion” (p. 44)

“Upon considering the material placed on record for the limited purpose of framing of charge, it is often seen that the prosecution seeks to project its case as a coherent and well-knitted narrative. While it may superficially appear so, a closer examination within the contours permitted at this stage may reveal that facts have been arranged to support a predetermined conclusion. The Court is required to guard against being carried by presentation alone.” (p. 44)

Elucidation: This is the court’s opening warning shot: it suggests the prosecution did not allow evidence to lead to conclusions; it arranged material to fit a conclusion already chosen—and cautions itself against being impressed by packaging.

2) “The prosecution’s narrative… collapses under its own weight” (p. 106)

“The prosecution’s narrative thus collapses under its own weight: the policy features assailed as suspicious are, in substance and effect, those which strengthen competition and constrain concentration. Far from lending support to the theory of undue benefit to the so-called ‘South Group’, these provisions, when examined in their correct regulatory context, affirm the defence case.” (p. 106)

Elucidation: The court flips the case on its head: the very provisions cited as evidence of cartel-benefit are read as pro-competition safeguards. It is not just rejection; it is inversion.

3) “Selective emphasis or overstatement… undermines” fairness (p. 168)

“A circumstance that merely indicates that 36 pages were photocopied at a hotel has been treated as a conclusive link in the alleged chain of conspiracy. When inferential coincidences are framed as established facts or when an inference unsupported by the primary statements and documents is presented with such finality, it risks distorting the appreciation of evidence at the threshold stage. A fair trial requires a balanced and faithful presentation of material; selective emphasis or overstatement of circumstances undermines that standard and directly affects the right of the accused to an impartial adjudication.” (p. 168)

Elucidation: The court calls out exaggeration—building conspiracy from trivia—and links it to constitutional fairness: distortion at the threshold corrodes the accused’s right to an impartial process.

4) “Superficial arithmetical assumption divorced from economic reality” (p. 180)

“The prosecution’s theory, resting on a superficial arithmetical assumption divorced from economic reality, thus collapses at the threshold and cannot, in law, sustain an inference of undue benefit, quid pro quo or corrupt intent.” (p. 180)

Elucidation: This targets the prosecution’s financial logic. The court says the numbers were used naively, without market context—so the inference of corruption cannot legally follow.

5) “Cannot be countenanced… wholly unsatisfactory” (pp. 230–231)

“The investigating agency initially represented to this Court that a copy of the said statement had not been supplied to it. However, upon the opening of the sealed cover… it subsequently emerged that the Investigating Agency had, in fact, received a copy of the statement… A representation so made, which stands squarely contradicted by the record itself, cannot be countenanced. The conduct reflected from the record is wholly unsatisfactory and inconsistent with the duty of fairness, candour and transparency expected of an investigating agency. Further, the said statement was not supplied to the accused persons, a lapse that directly impinges upon the fairness of the proceedings.” (pp. 230–231)

Elucidation: This is among the harshest passages: the court records a representation contradicted by the record and labels the conduct incompatible with investigative candour—then notes the accused were denied the statement, impairing fairness.

6) “Conscious abuse of official position… strikes at the very core” (p. 238)

“The Court is therefore constrained to observe that such a course of action reduces the investigative process to a self-serving exercise, where legal technicalities are invoked not to uncover the truth, but to shield investigative lapses and to construct a post-facto defence in the event that suppression or distortion of material facts is exposed during judicial scrutiny. Such conduct amounts to a conscious abuse of official position and strikes at the very core of the criminal justice system. The Court… recommends initiation of appropriate departmental proceedings against the erring investigating officer for framing A-1 as an accused in the absence of any material against him.” (p. 238)

Elucidation: Extraordinary language. The court suggests the investigation used “technicalities” to cover lapses, calls it a conscious abuse of office, and recommends departmental action—rare, and reputationally devastating.

7) “Investigation steered by a preconceived outcome” (pp. 455–456)

“What emerges instead is a troubling picture of an investigation steered by a preconceived outcome rather than by objective evaluation of evidence. Lawful administrative actions and policy decisions appear to have been selectively extracted, stripped of context, and artificially interlinked to manufacture an appearance of conspiracy. Such an approach reflects a marked departure from the settled principles governing fair investigation and betrays an effort to substitute inference and conjecture for proof.” (pp. 455–456)

Elucidation: The court accuses the prosecution of “manufacturing” conspiracy by decontextualising lawful acts—suggesting not poor investigation but directional, outcome-driven investigation.

8) “Unwarranted expansion of the net… abuse of process… miscarriage of justice” (p. 428)

“The investigating agency is expected to act with fairness and restraint, particularly in cases carrying grave consequences for personal liberty, reputation and dignity. The present prosecution reflects an unwarranted expansion of the net in the absence of evidence and a failure to distinguish between legitimate political activity and criminal conduct. Continuation of proceedings founded on such tenuous premises would amount to an abuse of process and result in a miscarriage of justice.” (p. 428)

Elucidation: This is a full-spectrum condemnation: no restraint, no evidence-based boundaries, and a conflation of politics with crime—so continuing the case would itself be unjust.

9) “Conspicuous absence… even a foundational suspicion” (p. 517)

“This Court considers it necessary to record that the present matter has posed an exceptional degree of difficulty in the formation of a prima facie opinion… it soon became apparent that no such material emerged at any intermediate stage, compelling the Court to undertake a comprehensive examination of the statement of each witness until the very last. What stands out on such scrutiny is the conspicuous absence of any fact or circumstance which could legitimately give rise to even a foundational suspicion, much less a prima facie inference, of the commission of the offences imputed to the accused persons.” (p. 517)

Elucidation: The court virtually narrates its own effort to locate even minimum material—and records that none existed. “Foundational suspicion” is below “prima facie”; the court says even that floor was not met.

10) “Narrative construction rather than truth discovery” (p. 535)

“The manner in which the investigating agency has proceeded, by repeatedly recording the statements of the approver without justification and over a prolonged duration, reflects an exercise of discretion that cannot be characterised as fair or reasonable. If left unchecked, such conduct risks converting the exceptional mechanism of pardon into an instrument for narrative construction rather than truth discovery, thereby causing serious prejudice to the accused and eroding confidence in the criminal justice process. Fairness in investigation is a constitutional mandate that restrains the exercise of State power and operates as a safeguard against arbitrary or capricious prosecutorial conduct.” (p. 535)

Elucidation: This is the constitutional culmination: the court warns that approvers were used to build a story, not find truth—and anchors investigative fairness in constitutional discipline of state power.

Closing note for the supplementary piece

Taken together, these are not routine observations at the stage of charge. The order repeatedly suggests an investigation driven by narrative, selective presentation, and post-facto stitching—culminating in the rare step of recommending departmental proceedings against the investigating officer. Even if appellate courts later take a different view on discharge, these judicial phrases—“predetermined conclusion”, “manufacture an appearance”, “cannot be countenanced”, “conscious abuse of official position”—already form a severe institutional indictment of how the prosecution was built.

In a constitutional system, that matters as much as the outcome for any set of accused persons. A citizen can accept that prosecutions will sometimes fail; what should not be normalised is a prosecutorial method that, in the court’s own assessment, substitutes inference for proof and narrative for evidence, while the accused bear the real-world costs of arrest, incarceration, and public stigma. The ultimate appellate result may still evolve. But these lines, read in sequence, already pose a settled question to the institutions of investigation: if fairness is a constitutional mandate, who bears responsibility when the investigative process itself is found wanting?